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heritance should be accorded to the adopted child and the entire
adopting family as though the child were the natural child of his
adopters.
ROBERT R. AUGSBURGER

Physician-Patient Privilege as Affected by
Mode of Gaining Information
WHILE TREATING decedent over a period of fifteen years for
various physical ailments, a doctor learned that she was suffering
from senile dementia. Nothing appearing to the contrary, the
court assumed that the doctor did not treat decedent for mental
infirmities and that knowledge of her mental deficiency did not
aid him in his treatment of her other ailments. Over objection,
the doctor was allowed to testify in a will contest that decedent
suffered from senile dementia. Held, in Carson v. Beatley:' Such
information is not privileged, because the physician had been attending the patient for a physical illness not connected with or
related to the mental ailment.'
In the principal case, the court classified the Ohio cases on
the physician-patient privilege into three groups:
1. Cases in which the information was related to a physical or
mental condition for which the doctor was treating the patient,
and was learned by the physician by examination of or by
other confidential communication from the patient during a
professional visit.3 In Ohio such information is privileged."
1 82 N.E.2d 745 (Ohio Ct. App. 1948).
2 This

note will make no attempt to discuss the question of who may waive the
physician-patient privilege; nor will it consider whether or not the privilege
should apply in a case involving testamentary capacity. It should be noted,
however, that most cases involving the operation of the privilege in insanity
cases are those in which the question of testamentary capacity is drawn into
issue in a will contest. For an example of a case permitting waiver, see Fraser v.

Jennison, 42 Mich. 206, 225, 3 N.W. 882, 891 (1879). Wigmore doubts that
the privilege should apply in insanity cases. 8 WIOMoRE, EViDENCE § 2384

(3d ed. 1940).
3 It is possible to imagine information which although not learned during a
professional visit is still privileged. For example, a patient might write to his
doctor giving him information which he had neglected to mention at the time
of the visit.
4 McKee v. New Idea, Inc., 44 N.E.2d 697 (Ohio Ct. App. 1942); Russel v.
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2. Cases in which the doctor acquired the information by observation, rather than by examination of the patient. The Ohio
cases hold that such information is not privileged, even if
learned during a professional visit.'
3. Cases in which the doctor learns of a mental condition while
treating a physical ailment not connected with or related to
any mental ailment-as in the Carson case. In the Ohio cases
dealing with this situation, the courts have held that such information is not privileged.'
At least three situations similar to that involved in the cases
in the last group can be imagined. They are:
1. While treating a patient for a physical condition, the doctor
discovers another and unrelated physical condition.
2. While treating a patient for a mental condition, the doctor
discovers an unrelated physical condition.
3. While treating a patient for a mental condition, the doctor
discovers another and unrelated mental condition.
In the Carson case the court carefully limits its discussion to
the situation wherein the doctor discovers a mental condition unrelated to the physical condition for which he was treating the
patient.7 But if the rule of the Carson case is sound, it should
apply equally to the three analogous situations.
So far as can be determined, therefore, from existing case law,
information to be priviliged in Ohio must not only be learned
during a professional visit but must meet two additional requirements:
Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 70 Ohio App. 113, 41 N.E.2d 251 (1941); Baker v.
Industrial Comnm'n, 135 Ohio St. 491, 21 N.E.2d 593 (1939); Prudential Ins.
Co. v. Heaton, 20 Ohio L. Abs. 454 (Ct. App. 1934); Industrial Comm'n v.
Strassel, 11 Ohio App. 234 (1919) (holding that a narrative about the cause of
an accident is privileged); Ausdenmoore v. Holzback, 89 Ohio St. 381, 106
N.E. 41 (1914); Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen v. Daly, 11 Ohio C.C.
(N.S.) 464 (1908).
5
Heiselmann v. Franks, 48 Ohio App. 536, 194 N.E. 604 (1934), see Note,
2 Ohio Op. 389 (1935); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Howle, 68 Ohio St. 614,
68 N.E. 4 (1903); cf. Bahl v. Byal, 90 Ohio St. 129, 106 N.E. 766 (1914) (cited
for this holding in Olney v. Schurr, 21 Ohio L. Abs. 630 (Ct. App. 1936), but
distinguishable on the ground of waiver).
6 Carson v. Beatley, 82 N.E.2d 745 (Ohio Ct. App. 1948); Meier v. Peirano,
76 Ohio App. 9, 62 N.E.2d 920 (1945); Olney v. Schurr, 21 Ohio L. Abs. 630
(Ct. App. 1936). Although the Olney case was placed in this group by the court
in the Carson case, the case may just as logically be cited in the second group.
7The language in Meier v. Peirano, supra note 6, however, is broad enough to
include the three analogous situations.
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1. It must relate to the ailment for which the patient sought
or was given treatment.
2. It must not come as a result of "observation."
INFORMATION

LEARNED

BY EXAMINATION BUT NOT RELATED TO

THE CONDITION FOR WHICH THE PATIENT SOUGHT OR WAS

GIVEN TREATMENT

Statutes creating a physician-patient privilege usually provide
that information acquired by the doctor is privileged if the "information was necessary to enable him to prescribe as a physician
or do any act" for the patient as a surgeon.' The cases have
generally construed such statutes as making information confidentially acquired privileged if it is ordinarily necessary or useful in
treating the condition for which the patient sought or is being
given treatment,9 or if it is relevant to that condition; or if it is
learned by examination, regardless of whether it is useful in treatment or related to the condition being treated.1"
No cases have been found in which the patient told the physician in confidence about a condition which he thought might be
related to the condition for which he sought or was given treatment, but which the physician ruled out as being wholly unrelated.
It would seem however that such information should be privileged.
Thus despite the use of the word "necessary" in the statutes,
it is ordinarily recognized that something less than "necessary"
was meant by the legislatures. It seems safe to say that the legislatures were attempting only to limit the operation of the privilege
to facts communicated in confidence to a doctor as a doctor.
The Ohio statute merely provides that "a communication
made . . . in that [physician-patient] relation"" is privileged."
8

ARK. STAT. ANN., tit. 28, § 607 (1947). The statutes of the several states are
collected in 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380 (3d ed. 1940). "The privilege is
intended (and by most statutes is declared) to protect only those communications which are necessary for obtaining the benefits of the professional relation,
in other words, for enabling the physician to prescribe remedies or relief."

8 id. § 2383.
9The word "treatment" is used in this note in such a sense as to include advice,
prescription, diagnosis or such other service as a doctor customarily provides.
10 See cases cited notes 15, 19, 20, and 34 infra.
11 Italics supplied.
12 OIO GEN. CODE § 11494: "The following persons shall not testify in certain
respects: 1. An attorney concerning a communication made to him by his
client in that relation, or his advice to his client; or a physician, concerning a

communication made to him by his patient in that relation, or his advice to
his patient ..... " That the word "communication" is not limited to verbal
communications, see Ausdenmoore v. Holzback, 89 Ohio St. 381, 382, 106
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In Meier v. Peirano," which the Carson case follows, the court
recognized that the statute seeks to protect communications "made
to the doctor in his professional capacity
."
Nevertheless the
court said that the information is learned within the professional
capacity only when it has "a relationship to an examination, diagnosis, or treatment of the particular malady or maladies which
brought about the relationship."4 Thus, although recognizing in
general terms that the Ohio legislature meant to protect approximately the same information as did the legislatures of states
in which the statutes read "necessary for treatment," the Ohio
court restricts the privilege more narrowly than the courts of such
states, even though the words "in that relation" are susceptible
to a much broader interpretation.
The requirement that the information be "necessary for treatment" in order to be privileged has posed a difficult problem, for
those courts which continue to talk as though the requirement
were a literal one, in cases in which the doctor by examining the
patient discovers a condition unrelated to that for which the
patient sought or is given treatment. Some of these courts 5 have
attempted to find necessity by inferring it in any situation in
which the information so acquired might be relevant. Thus, in
a tuberculosis case, knowledge of mental soundness was held to
be necessary for treatment, though nothing appeared in the record
to show affirmatively that it was necessary. 6 The basic reason
underlying such a holding is the difficulty in determining in many
cases whether or not the mental condition of the patient has influenced the course of a doctor's treatment. The doctor may well
have allowed for the mental quirks and irregularities of the patient
N.E. 41 (1914): "We hold that a communication by the patient to the physician
may be, not only by word of mouth, but also by exhibiting the body or any
part thereof to the physician for his opinion, examination, or diagnosis, and
that that sort of communication is quite as clearly within the statutes as a communication by word of mouth." See also 8 WIGIAORE, EvmDENCE § 2384 (3d ed.
1940).
13 76 Ohio App. 9, 12, 62 N.E.2d 920, 922 (1945). At the conclusion of its
discussion the court refers to 8 WmiMoRa, EVIDENCE § 2380 et seq. (3d ed. 1940)
for a general discussion of the privilege.
14 Italics supplied.
15 In re Budan's Estate, 156 Cal. 230, 104 Pac. 442 (1909); In re Nelson's
Estate, 132 Cal. 182, 64 Pac. 294 (1901); In re Redfield's Estate, 116 Cal. 637,

48 Pac. 794 (1897); E. C. Jones v. City of Caldwell, 23 Idaho 467, 130 Pac. 995
(1913); Long v. Garey Inv. Co., 110 N.W. 26 (Iowa 1906); Battis v. Chicago,
R.I. & P. Ry., 124 Iowa 623, 100 N.W. 543 (1904); Renihan v. Dennin, 103
N.Y. 573, 9 N.E. 320 (1886).
16 In re Redfield's Estate, 116 Cal. 637, 48 Pac. 794 (1897).
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without consciously recognizing that he has made such an allowance. Perhaps these courts have been influenced to some degree
by the psychosomatic theories of medicine. Leaders in the field
of medicine are coming to recognize that the human being is a
unity which cannot be comparted; 17 that it is not possible in

most situations to segregate one symptom, or one condition, but
that the entire being must be considered.
It is frequently possible to justify in another way an inference
by the court that information is literally necessary for treatment
even though the information acquired by examining the patient
is unrelated to a condition for which the patient sought or is given
treatment. Often when a patient consults a physician he expects
to be treated not only for the infirmity which the patient recognizes, but for all ailments and disabilities which the doctor discovers, or may discover by reasonable examination. To comply
with this expectation it is necessary that the doctor constantly
search to find all that is wrong with the patient. Although this
may be a valid argument for holding that information so discovered is privileged in the hands of the family doctor or general
practitioner, it is doubtful whether it would apply in the case of
the specialist. The case of the diagnostician would present a most
interesting problem.
Most courts, however, have not interpreted the words "necessary for treatment" literally. Often, while admitting that the
condition discovered by the doctor was one which had no bearing
upon the treatment expected or received, they have held nevertheless that information about such a condition is privileged."8
Many of these courts have failed to express adequately the reasons
for this conclusion. The courts of Utah, for example, have said
merely that the reason all information learned by examination
should be privileged is that the physician-patient privilege statute
should be liberally construed. 9
The most persuasive argument in favor of extending the
privilege to include all conditions discovered as a result of the
physician's examining the patient is that the examination is ordinarily necessary or useful for treatment, and the discovery of
conditions unrelated to that for which the patient sought or was
being given treatment is a normal consequence of the examina17 For a recent work on psychosomatic theory written in terms a layman can
understand see DUNBAR, MIND AND BODY (1949).
18 See cases collected in Note, L.R.A. 1918E 974.
19 In re Alstine's Estate, 26 Utah 193, 72 Pac. 942 (1903).
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tion.2" To hold that such information is not within the privilege
robs the privilege statutes of their spirit.21 The purpose of the
statutes is to encourage a patient to submit himself to examination without fear that the conditions so discovered will become
the subject of testimony in a courtroom. To allow the doctor to
testify about the conditions he has learned by examination is
destructive of the confidence that the statute intended to instill.22
Furthermore, it is unfair to place the physician in the position of
one who should discover all relevant material, but who is hesitant
to probe lest he uncover a secret about which his patient would
not wish him to testify.23 It is the more unfair in that if he fails
to search deeply enough he may lay himself open to a malpractice
suit by the patient.24
It therefore appears that even in information is of no use
whatever in the doctor's handling of the case, and even in those
rare instances when the physician by contract is limited to the
treatment of a single condition, the better rule is that information is privileged if learned by an examination which was made
by the doctor during his professional attendance upon the patient.
Carson v. Beatley answers this by a claim that the physicianpatient privilege statute should be strictly construed.25 Such an
answer is as inadequate as is the argument of the Utah court that
such statutes should be liberally construed.
INFORMATION LEARNED BY "OBSERVATION"

It is of course requisite to the application of the privilege that
a doctor-patient relationship exist.2" If the doctor gains information before the relationship comes into being, or after it has terminated, such information is not privileged, however it may have
been learned. Thus if a doctor were to observe at a party that
20

Fritcher v. Kelly, 34 Idaho 471, 201 Pac. 1037 (1921); Klein v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 221 N.Y. 449, 117 N.E. 942 (1917); Nelson v. Village of Oneida,
156 N.Y. 219, 50 N.E. 802 (1898).

21

Fritcher v. Kelly, supra note 20; In re Darragh's Estate, 15 N. Y. St. Rep. 452

(Surr. Ct. 1887).

22

Professor Wigmore criticizes the physician-patient privilege on the ground
that the information given the doctor is rarely intended to be confidential.
8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380a (3d ed. 1940).
23 The -honor of the profession" is the most valid reason for the privilege,
according to Wigmore. 8 WiGMoR, EVIDENE § 2380a (3d ed. 1940).
24

See Stephens v. Williams, 226 Ala. 534, 147 So. 608 (1933), and examples

given in RYGAN, MEDIcAL MALPRAcTIcE 15.18 (1945).
25 Citing Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N.E.2d 245 (1947).
26 3 JoNzs, EvIDENcE § 760d (4th ed. 1938).
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one of the guests who had formerly been his patient, but was no
longer under his care, was suffering from senile dementia, such
information would not be privileged."
But even where the relationship exists, in order for information
which a doctor learns to be privileged, the information must have
been confidential.28 If, for example, a patient approaches his physician at a party, and in the presence of other guests openly discloses his ailment, and requests the physician's advice, the
disclosure is not privileged.29 Under such circumstances the patient
obviously did not intend the information to be confidential.
Once it is established that a doctor-patient relationship existed,
then it becomes vital to know in what manner the doctor gained
his information.
The courts have distinguished between information learned
by what they have called casual, general or mere observation and
information learned by examination. The difference between the
two may best be illustrated by saying that when the physician
meets a patient he is playing a dual role. In his first character
he is a human being in a room with another human being. In
this role he sees and experiences the things that he would see or
experience if he visited a friend on a purely social call. Information learned in this way is learned by observation. In his second
character, he is a physician attending a patient. To him, in this
role, the patient makes available further information, which is
confidential between doctor and patient, in order to obtain treatment. Information learned in this way is acquired by examination. Although the line between these two ways of obtaining
information appears to be clear-cut, they gradually blend into
each other, and in many situations it is difficult to determine by
which of them the information is gained. As the two approach
each other the precise circumstances under which the information
was learned may well become the critical factor. For example, a
court will probably be more inclined to say that information
learned in the physician's office during a professional visit was
learned by examination, than information which was learned at
a party or social affair. The best test would seem to be that if
27 Bower v. Bower, 142 Ind. 194, 41 N.E. 523 (1895) (doctor approached expatient on the road to collect his bill).
28 8 WIGNIORE, EVMENCE § 2381 (3d ed. 1940). In all privileges "the fumdamental assumption has been that communications, in order to deserve protection, must be confidential in their origin."
29 Ibid.
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the patient could not or did not bother to conceal his condition
from other persons who were or might be casually present, the
information was learned by observation and not by examination.
The question of whether information is privileged generally
arises in cases in which the doctor did not meet the patient except at the doctor's office, or the patient's home, and only then
for the purpose of treating the patient. In such a situation, most
of the information which is acquired by the physician is ordinarily
obtained by examination. Yet, it is possible that the condition of
the patient is so manifest that any person sitting in the doctor's
anteroom, or visiting the patient in his home, would recognize it.
If, for example, a patient is obviously pregnant, or clearly insane,
the doctor's knowledge of this does not come as a result of professional confidence, but as a consequence of what may aptly be
called "mere observation". 30
The Indiana courts have held that facts observed in the place
of treatment are privileged because the doctor was able to learn
of the facts only because the parties met as doctor and patient.3
They further support their position by saying that the privilege
statute should be liberally construed. 2 The gist of the Indiana
position is that since the meeting between physician and patient
is essential for treatment, the facts learned at the meeting are
privileged, whether learned by examination or observation. This
reasoning wholly overlooks the contention that information learned
entirely by observation is not properly confidential. Carried to its
logical conclusion, it could prevent a doctor from testifying about
facts clearly visible, which the patient made no attempt to hide
from the world as a whole. Indiana has held, for example, that
the physician may not testify that his patient was obviously intoxicated.33 If this is secret information intended to be confiden30The

examples set forth are used as obvious examples of information learned
by observation. It is not meant to imply that in order for information learned
at the place of treatment to be considered as having been learned by observation, the condition must be unavoidably obvious and manifest. But, as before
pointed out, in a close case it is likely that a court will tend to find that information learned in the place of treatment was learned by examination.
31 Towles v. McCurdy, 163 Ind. 12, 71 N.E. 129 (1904); Gurley v. Park, 135
Ind. 440, 35 N.E. 279 (1893); Morris v. Morris, 119 Ind. 341, 21 N.E. 918
(1889).
32Towles v. McCurdy, 163 Ind. 12, 14, 71 N.E. 129, 130 (1904): "The construction given the statute... has been much broader than the language
of the act."
33Chicago, L. S. & S.B. Ry. v. Walas, 192 Ind. 369, 135 N.E. 150 (1922);
NewYork, C. & St. L. R.R.v. Shields, 185 Ind. 704, 112 N.E. 762 (1916). That
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tial between the doctor and his patient, it is indeed difficult to
imagine any information which would not be confidential.
The better reasoned cases, as, for example, those of New
York, have drawn the line between symptoms observed, and symptoms learned by examination. 4 Symptoms observed are held not
to be privileged, 5 while symptoms learned through examination
are privileged. 8 As long as the information did not come as a
result of examination, the patient has no right to throw the veil
of secrecy around it."7 On the other hand, facts learned by examination are learned because of the confidence of the patient in
his physician."8 The patient has bared himself to the professional
scrutiny of the doctor alone and therefore the information meets
the requirement of being a confidential communication.
The Indiana rule has one advantage over the New York rule
in that it is practically self-executing.

If the doctor learned of

the symptom during the course of a professional visit, the information is privileged, whether learned by observation or examina-

tion. The New York distinction makes it necessary that the judge
in a close case determine the manner in which the doctor learned
the facts.3 9 Yet the mere fact that a rule of law may be easily
applied is not of itself enough to justify it. In many situations a
the Indiana courts do not mean to dispose of the requirement of confidence,
see Towles v. McCurdy, 163 Ind. 12, 71 N.E. 129 (1904).
34 In re Black's Estate, 132 Cal. 392, 64 Pac. 695 (1901); In re Redfield's Estate,
116 Cal. 637, 48 Pac. 794 (1897); In re Asery's Estate, 76 N.Y.S.2d 790 (Surr.
Ct. 1948); Westphal v. State, 79 N.Y.S.2d 634 (Ct. Cl. 1948); In re Strong's
Estate, 6 N.Y.S.2d 300 (Surr. Ct. 1938); Klein v. Prudential Ins. Co., 221
N.Y. 449, 117 N.E. 942 (1917); In re Preston's Will, 113 App. Div. 732, 99 N.Y.
Supp. 312 (2d Dep't 1906); Nelson v. Village of Oneida, 156 N.Y. 219, 50
N.E. 802 (1898); In re Loewenstine's Estate, 2 Misc. 323, 21 N.Y. Supp. 931
(C.P. 1893); Brigham v. Gott 20 N.Y. St. Rep. 420, 3 N.Y. Supp. 518 (Sup.
Ct. 1889); In re Williams' Estate, 186 Wis. 160, 202 N.W. 314 (1925).
35 Klein v. Prudential Ins. Co., 221 N.Y. 449, 117 N.E. 942 (1917).
6 Nelson v. Village of Oneida, 156 N.Y. 219, 50 N.E. 802 (1898).
37The Ohio Supreme Court, in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Howle, 68 Ohio
St. 614, 68 N.E. 4 (1903), observed that such facts are not communications
to the physician by the patient, but are learned by the doctor independently
of the relationship. Apparently what the court meant was that such information is not the type of communication covered by the statute because not
confidential. See note 12 supra.
38 Klein v. Prudential Ins. Co., 221 N.Y. 449, 117 N.E. 942 (1917); In re
Preston's Will, 113 App. Div. 732, 99 N.Y. Supp. 312 (2d Dep't 1906); Nelson
v. Village of Oneida, 156 N.Y. 219, 50 N.E. 802 (1898).
39 This rule is analogous to the rule in the attorney-client privilege. 8 WIOMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2306 (3d ed. 1940) (the privilege attaches to information gained
through the professional relationship but not to information gained by mere
observation).

